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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Elements of Reasonable Notice in
Eminent Domain Proceedings
In Schroeder v. New York 1 the question of what constitutes
reasonable notice to a property owner in eminent domain pro-
ceedings was litigated. Pursuant to the New York City Water
Supply Act, 2 notice of an intention to divert the Neversink
River was given by publication in two newspapers in the county
where the real estate was located and by posting on trees in the
vicinity of the property. 3 According to the Act, all claims for
damages were barred after three years. 4 Eight years later,
appellant claimed in equity that she was given inadequate
notice, since the newspapers used for the purpose of providing
notice were not published in the largest communities of the
county and there were other towns nearer the real estate in
which notice could have been published. Secondly, none of the
handbills were posted directly on her property. Furthermore,
the handbills did not include her name, despite the fact it could
have been easily ascertained from the deed books or tax rolls.
There was no indication in the notices of the remedies she
might have. The court held that the notice was inadequate and
appellant was entitled to a hearing on the question of damages.
This decision raises serious questions concerning limitations
on the power of eminent domain. "The power of eminent
domain is an attribute of sovereignty and inheres in every
independent state." 5 It is deemed to be a power essential to the
proper functioning of the government of the state, which can-
not be contracted away.6 "It is not a personal privilege, it is a
special authority, impressed with a public character, and to be
1 83 Sup. Ct. 279 (1962).
2 Administrative Code of City of New York, Tide K41.
3 Administrative Code of City of New York, Title K41-8.0.
4 Administrative Code of City of New York, Title K41-18.0.
5 Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Cincinnati v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912); Boom Company v. Patterson, 98
U.S. 403 (1878).
6 United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 at p. 280 (1943).
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utilized for a public end." 7 The state may occupy land without
any noticeto theproperty owner as long as the ownerat some stage
of the proceedings has an opportunity to be heard and to offer
evidence of the value of the land taken. 8 This requirement is
satisfied if the value of the land is fixed by persons who view the
land, even if the property owner is not permitted to offer
evidence, if the award is subject to judicial review on which a
trial upon evidence may be had. 9 The power of eminent
domain may be delegated to a municipality. ].o
It is clear no notice before the taking of the property is
necessary, 1 since the power is originally a legislative and not a
judicial function. 12 Due process does require that there be
notice and an opportunity to be heard on the question of com-
pensation. 13 Thus, the only issues in this case are whether
there was a reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard.
It has been said that due process requirements are more
exacting in the case of a resident owner, than in the case of a
nonresident owner. 14 Constructive notice has been upheld
against nonresident owners in a number of cases. 15  In the
leading case on the point,16 it was said:
7 Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Galveston Wharf Company v.
Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1922); Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia
245 U.S. 20 (1917).
8 Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945); Georgia v. Chattanooga, supra, note
7; Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923); Bragg v. Weaver, 251
U.S. 57 (1919).
9 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
10 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); Georgia v. Chatta-
nooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668(1923); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); Sears v. Akron, 246 U.S. 242,
(1918).
11 United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954); United States v. Cormack, 329 U.S. 230 (1946); Georgia
v. Chattanooga, supra, note 10; Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700
(1923); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, supra, note 10; Bragg v. Weaver, supra,
note 10; Sears v. Akron, supra, note 10.
12 Walker v. Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); North Laramie Land Co. v.
Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
13 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, supra, note 12; Bragg v. Weaver, supra,
note 12; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1898); Pear-
son v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877).
14 Annot., 1 L.Ed.2d 1635 (1957).
15 Wick v. Chelan Electric Co., 280 U.S. 108 (1929); Huling v. Kaw Valley R. &
Improv. Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
16 Huling v. Kaw Valley R. & Improv. Co., supra, note 15.
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The owner of real estate who is a nonresident of the
State within which the property lies, cannot evade the duties
and obligations which the law imposes upon him in regard
to such property by his absence from the State. Because he
cannot be reached by some process of the courts of the
State, which of course, have no efficacy beyond their own
borders, he cannot therefore hold his property exempt from
the liabilities, duties and obligations which the State has a
right to impose upon such property... 17
This emphasizes a point that has long been recognized.
[The State] has control over property within its limits;
and the condition of ownership of real estate therein,
whether the owner be stranger or citizen, is subject to its
rules concerning the holding, the transfer, liability to
obligations, private or public, and the modes of establishing
titles thereto ... The well-being of every community re-
quires that the title therein to real estate be secure ... The
duty of accomplishing this is local in its nature; it is not a
matter of national concern or vested in the general govern-
ment; it remains with the State; and, as this duty is one of
the State, the manner of discharging it must be determined
by the State, and no proceeding which it provides can be
declared invalid, unless it conflicts with some special
inhibitions of the Constitution or against natural justice. 1 8
Consequently, personal service upon a nonresident owner is not
essential and it is difficult to see why a different rule should
apply to a resident., 9 The owner of real estate usually arranges
some means to learn of any attack on his property. If the State
seizes his property, notice by publication or posting is just an
additional means of informing the owner of the State's action. 2 0
We must now look at the circumstances of the Shroeder
case to see if they were sufficient to take it outside the general
17 Huling v. Kaw Valley R. & Improv. Co., supra, note 15, at 563.
18 Ardnt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 320, 321 (1890). See also Clark v. Willard, 294
U.S. 211 (1935); Grannus v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Dewey v. Des
Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
9 Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57(1919).
20 Cf., Mullane v. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (dicta) (1950); Huling
v. Kaw Valley R. & Improv. Co., 130 U.S. 559, 564 (1889).
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rule. The right of eminent domain may to the extent and for
the purposes designated by statute, be exercised by munici-
palities. 21 New York City was seeking the right to divert the
waters of the Neversink River. A State can acquire the right to
divert the waters of a stream by legislative grant. 2 2
Appellant did not object to the statute, but she did object
to the manner in which its provisions were carried out. How-
ever, it would seem that the objection was not timely, since it
came eight years after the river had been diverted. The period
of the statute of limitations was three years. 2 3 Courts of equity
usually refuse relief where it appears that the complainant,
before seeking the aid of equity, permitted the lapse of a period
comparable to the one designated by the statute of limita-
tions,24 unless there is some extraordinary ground for granting
relief.2 5 "A court of equity... has always refused its aid to
state demands, where the party has slept upon his rights, and
acquiesced for a great length of time." 26 The party seeking
relief must use reasonable diligence.27
It cannot be said that reasonable diligence was exerted in the
instant case. As the New York Court of Appeals said, "[I]t is of
considerable significance that the effect of the challenged
diversion was clearly apparent long before the expiration of the
three-year period within which the plaintiff was required to file
her claim." 28 Obviously, appellant did not use reasonable
diligence. Appellant claimed she was damaged because the
velocity of the flow of the Neversink River was decreased. This
so-called injury should certainly have been apparent within
three years, yet appellant waited eight years to bring suit. 2 9
21 Cases cited note 10, supra.
2 2 Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668 (1923).
23 Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Washburn, 159 U.S. 423 (1895); Curtner v. United
States, 149 U.S. 662 (1893); Hammond v. Hopkins, 143 U.S. 224 (1892);
2 POMEROY EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 419(a) (5th ed. 1941).
24 2 POMEROY, § 419(a).
25 Smith v. Clay, 3 Brow. Ch. 638, 29 Eng. Rep. 743 (1767).
26 Walker v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 245 U.S. 398 (1918); Moran v. Horsky, 178
U.S. 205 (1900); Baker v. Cummings, 169 U.S. 189 (1898).
27 Schroeder v. New York City, 10 N.Y.2d 522, 527, 180 N.E.2d 568, 570 (1962);
Cf., Bellingham Bay & B.C. Ry. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U.S. 314 (1899).
28 Nelson y. New York City, 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
29 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925); American Land Co.
v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
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The Supreme Court has often said that when it decides
whether notice is reasonable, it will refer to the subject matter
with which the notice deals. 30 It will view "with great respect
the judgment of state courts upon what should be deemed
public uses in any state." It would seem that the "great respect"
paid in determining what is a public use, should also be
appropriate in determining what is reasonable notice.
Appellant also sought relief on the ground that neither the
newspaper publication, nor the posted notices indicated what
action a property owner might take to recover damages, nor did
they intimate any time limit upon the filing of a claim. The
general rule is that all that is required is notice of the pro-
ceedings, and once a person has notice that such action is
planned, he is bound to take cognizance of all further steps in
the proceedings,31 and it has been held that notice is sufficient
if the publication is of such a character that it creates a pre-
sumption that the owner of property affected, if present and
exercising ordinary care, will receive information as to what is
proposed and when and where he may be heard.32 It has
already been demonstrated that reasonable notice was given and
that the notice provided the necessary information, i.e., what
was proposed to be done or was done and when and where the
hearing would be had.
In reaching its decision the court relied primarily on two
cases. In Mullane v. Hanover Trust Company, 33 it was held that
notice by publication was not adequate to inform known, non-
resident beneficiaries of the settlement of accounts of common
trust fund in which numerous small trusts funds had been
invested. Clearly, there is a distinction between Mullane and the
instant case. The Mullane case involved intangible personalty,
in the instantcase visible, tangible realty. Itis possiblethe damage
in Mullane could not be recognized, even if the highest degree
of diligence were exercised; but, in the instant case, the damage
was readily evident within the three years in which suit could be
30 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 705 (1923). See also, Hairston v.
Danville & Western Railway, 208 U.S. 598 (1908); Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 163 U.S. 112 (1896).
31 North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925).
32 Bellingham Bay & B.C. Ry. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U.S. 314 (1899).
33 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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brought. Natural justice requires notice in the Mullane situa-
tion, but this is not true in the instant case.
The second case 34 which the court relied upon held that a
statute requiring notice by publication when eminent domain
proceedings were instituted against resident landowners
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This case can be distinguished on two grounds. The first is
that the statute provided that publication was sufficient if
notice were published once in the official city newspaper.
Secondly, the landowner had only thirty days in which to
appeal, or the decision became final. Due process was dearly
denied since no presumption (because of the short statute of
limitations) that a property owner used ordinary diligence could
be raised under this statute. Furthermore, the period provided
for appeal denied the property owner sufficient time to recog-
nize the damage, if he were in the same position as appellant in
the instant case.
The Supreme Court extended the requirements for reason-
able notice far beyond any limits heretofore demanded by due
process. Clearly the doctrine of laches should have applied,
even if notice were unreasonable. The cases relied on by the
Court are readily distinguishable and do not justify the decision
that was reached. Nevertheless, one must accept the fact that the
doctrine of constructive notice has been severely restricted and
that undoubtedly it will soon be an ancient, legal relic.
A. H. H.
34 Walker v. Hutchinson City, 353 U.S. 112 (1956).
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